- I am a SSHRC Postdoctoral Fellow at the School for International Studies at Simon Fraser University, where I specialize in judicial politics, authoritarianism, and the politics of Africa and the Middle East. Prior to Simon Fraser, I studied Islamic Studies at McGill University (Ph.D. 2015), Middle East Studies at the University of Chicago (M.A. 2007), and political science and religion at the University of Rochester (B.A. 2004). My primary research project investigates ... moreI am a SSHRC Postdoctoral Fellow at the School for International Studies at Simon Fraser University, where I specialize in judicial politics, authoritarianism, and the politics of Africa and the Middle East. Prior to Simon Fraser, I studied Islamic Studies at McGill University (Ph.D. 2015), Middle East Studies at the University of Chicago (M.A. 2007), and political science and religion at the University of Rochester (B.A. 2004).
My primary research project investigates the role of judicial actors during attempted democratic transitions in Egypt, Tunisia, and Sudan. Scholars of democratization have tended to regard judicial independence as necessary for a transition from authoritarianism to succeed. By contrast, my research views judges as strategic actors who, in the context of extreme political instability, may conclude that their interests would best be served by returning their country to authoritarian rule. This project creates a model to determine the factors that lead a judge to support or undermine democratization, with evidence gathered through interviews, textual analysis, and participant observation. A first round of fieldwork was conducted in Egypt in the winter of 2015, with a second round in Tunisia and Sudan to follow in 2016.
My dissertation was entitled “Law and the Structure of Authoritarian Rule: Knowledge, Sovereignty, and Judicial Power in Sudan, 1898-1985,” and was completed under the supervision of Dr. Khalid Mustafa Medani.
More information available at: www.jeffreyasachs.com.edit
According to the so-called "Insurance Theory" of judicial empowerment, incumbent elites create independent and empowered courts in order to protect themselves and their policies after leaving office. In many authoritarian regimes,... more
According to the so-called "Insurance Theory" of judicial empowerment, incumbent elites create independent and empowered courts in order to protect themselves and their policies after leaving office. In many authoritarian regimes, however, elites have very poor relations with their judiciaries, and therefore will have little reason to expect fair treatment from the courts in the event of their overthrow. Drawing on case studies from Sudan, Egypt, Mexico, and Argentina, this article shows that when regime-judiciary relations are poor, the logic of the Insurance Theory is reversed and increased political competition leads to less judicial independence instead of more. It then presents a revised version of the Insurance Theory better suited to authoritarian cases.
Research Interests:
This article offers a way of thinking about colonial-era legal reform that departs from traditional narratives by highlighting the importance of legal ambiguity in state building projects. Following the establishment of “Native... more
This article offers a way of thinking about colonial-era legal reform that departs from traditional narratives by highlighting the importance of legal ambiguity in state building projects. Following the establishment of “Native Administration” in the Sudan in the early 1920s, the British colonial government conferred expansive judicial and administrative powers on tribal sheikhs and nazirs (chiefs), while at the same time discouraging many attempts to formalize or standardize those powers, preferring instead that they remain informal and undefined. This policy, which I term “strategic ambiguity,” emerged out of a belief that tribal leaders would be more effective if they possessed maximum discretion and judicial flexibility, even though the result was a colonial government woefully ill-informed about much of its own judicial system. These findings point to a way of thinking about colonial-era legal reform in which governmental ignorance was actually productive of sovereignty, and not an obstacle to it.